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incentives between individuals. Whether such transmission of incentives
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Authority doesnt work without prestige, or prestige without distance.
Charles de Gaulle
Leaders are leaders only as long as they have the respect and loyalty
of their followers. Hans Selye
1 Introduction
Granovetter (1985) emphasizes that economic action is embedded in structures
of social relations. Examples include family rms, workplace relationships, and
alumni networks. Indeed, business mixes with pleasure inasmuch as personal and
professional networks overlap. Accordingly, it is often crucial to the governance of
an organization to understand when social ties among its members are benecial
and when they are harmful for achieving organizational objectives. This paper
attempts to shed light on this issue.
Opinion about the consequences of social ties for governance is divided. This
is reected by the tension between the crony capitalism view of social networks
as promoting expropriation and corruption and the social capital view of social
networks as promoting trust and cooperation.1 ;2 Many are, for example, critical
of the mélange of social ties and corporate control evident in family rms. Yet,
family ownership is the dominant form of corporate ownership around the world,
and in many countries, such as Thailand and Korea, economic growth has been
1Compare, for example, the surveys by Morck et al. (2005) and Khanna and Yafeh (2007).
More broadly, social ties have been shown to promote cooperation and trade in various settings,
including regional governments (Putnam, 1993), bank lending (Petersen and Rajan, 1994; Uzzi,
1999), and job search (Granovetter, 1974; Bian, 1997). Skeptics counter that social ties may
constrain a persons economic activity to her immediate network, thereby impairing adaptation
and growth (Olson, 1982; Portes and Landolt, 1996). In support of this view, some studies show
that social ties can lead to favoritism in bank lending (La Porta et al., 2003; Charumilind et
al., 2006), discrimination and nepotism (Becker, 1971; Fershtman et al., 2005), and corruption
(Callahan, 2005; Harris, 2007).
2In his book The Worlds Banker, Sebastian Mallaby narrates an anecdote about a discus-
sion between James Wolfensohn, then president of the World Bank, Suharto, then president of
Indonesia, and Zhu Rongji, then Vice-Premier of China, in which Suharto asks Zhu, Dont
you think we should tell the president of the World Bank about corruption in this part of the
world?, whereupon Suharto turns to Wolfensohn and says, You know, what you regard as
corruption in your part of the world, we regard as family values.
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driven by the success of family business groups (Claessens et al., 2000).
The analysis in this paper reconciles these opposing views to the extent that it
encompasses them in a single framework. The basic tenet is that social ties are, in
the abstract, a neutral governance instrument; they act solely as incentive bridges,
i.e., connections that transmit incentives among agents. Whether an organization
benets from such a transmission of incentives among its members depends on the
specic context. In other words, social ties can either improve or undermine gov-
ernance. This duality gives birth to two distinct modes of governance, which di¤er
in whether they encourage or discourage social ties within an organization. On the
one hand, good governance can involve giving some member(s) of an organization
the authority (and incentive) to discipline other members as is commonly postu-
lated in theories of governance in which case social ties undermine governance.
On the other hand, we show that good governance can also result from cultivating
loyalty within an organization, in which case social ties improve governance.
To demonstrate this logic, we revisit a classic governance problem: delegated
monitoring.3 A principal relies on an agent to implement an action, and hires a su-
pervisor to monitor the agent and, if necessary, to intervene. This may describe,
for example, the arrangement between a companys shareholders, management,
and board of directors. This basic framework is adapted to capture features of
organizations or settings in which social ties are salient. Two important examples
of such settings are family rms, such as the Wallenberg family in Sweden, and
gray directors, such as Bill Gates a longtime friend of Warren Bu¤ett serving
on the board of Berkshire Hathaway.4 Both examples feature, and hence motivate
us to build into the framework, elements of friendship (family, friends) and rep-
utability (family name, public image) as social factors that may a¤ect the quality
of governance.
Our objective is to analyze how these elements a¤ect the role of supervision.
To this end, we make two assumptions about the supervisor. First, the supervisor
is reputable in the sense that she may derive utility from being perceived as a
person of integrity, that is, as having honored her obligation to monitor the agent.
3See, for example, Diamond (1984), Tirole (1986), and Holmstrom and Tirole (1997).
4Gray directors are non-executive board members who have social ties to the CEO.
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Formally, we model this as a form of social recognition, whereby the supervisor
may experience pride (or shame) to the extent that the principal credits (blames)
her for the outcome.5 Second, the supervisor and the agent may share a friendship.
Formally, we model this in the form of directed altruism, whereby the supervisor
and the agent partly internalize each others well-being. This model allows us
to vary the importance of both social recognition and friendship. We refer to
these collectively as social incentives, whereas we reserve the term social ties for
friendship.
To isolate the role of social incentives, we begin our analysis with the case
of incomplete contracts, in which wages cannot be made contingent on outcome.
Without monetary incentives, the only motivation for the supervisor to monitor
is to earn social recognition. In this setting, we study how friendship a¤ects the
equilibrium outcome. Consistent with common sense, friendship undermines the
supervisors incentives to interfere with the agents action, resulting in reduced
monitoring. However, because friendship is mutual, it also inuences the agent:
It makes him more averse to actions that put the supervisor in a bad light, and
hence more inclined toward actions that are in the principals interest. We refer
to the former e¤ect of social ties as capture, as the supervisor becomes de facto
captured by the agent, and to the latter e¤ect as loyalization, as the agent
becomes loyalto the supervisor and, by extension, to the principal.
This dual e¤ect highlights that social ties merely make individual incentives
mutually contagious. In a given context, what matters to the principal is whose
incentives, the supervisors or the agents, prevail in this incentive tug-of-war;
that is, whether capture or loyalization dominates. Depending on this outcome,
the principal favors one of two fundamentally di¤erent modes of governance. In
one, the authority regime, the agent acts opportunistically, but the supervisor
assumes active responsibility by monitoring the agent and thereby assuring an
outcome in the principals interests. This regime is built on distance, distrust, and
conict between the supervisor and the agent. In the other, the loyalty regime,
the agent behaves in the principals interest on his own accord, which eliminates
5More precisely, we follow Benabou and Tirole (2006) and Ellingsen and Johannesson (2008)
in assuming that the supervisor values othersassessment of her type, with the di¤erence that
the type is determined ex interim in this model.
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the supervisors incentive (and need) to monitor. Although she does not monitor,
the supervisor fulls a key role: She assumes passive responsibility by bearing the
blame for undesirable outcomes, which deters the agent from acting opportunis-
tically.6 This regime is built on proximity, trust and mediation. In sum, these
two regimes are polar opposites along several spectra and, as such, represent two
fundamental modes of governance.7
The discourse on the e¤ect of social ties on governance can be recast in terms
of this dichotomy. The crony capitalism view reects the concern that social
ties undermine the authority regime, whereas the social capital view reects the
hope that social ties sustain the loyalty regime. This duality is central to an
important empirical prediction of the model: the relationship between the quality
of governance and the strength of social ties should be ambiguous. This is because
a given level of friendship may promote good governance in settings where issues
of social recognition are salient, but undermine governance elsewhere. Therefore,
to empirically distinguish contexts in which social ties are desirable from those in
which social ties are harmful, it is critically important to consider the e¤ects of
social ties and the inuence of social recognition in interaction.
Allowing for complete contracts i.e., performance-sensitive wages does not
a¤ect the essence of our argument. On the contrary, we nd that the principal
braidsmonetary and social incentives in a way that bears out the two modes
of governance: she optimally incentivizes either the supervisor to implement the
authority regime or the agent to implement the loyalty regime.8 The monetary
incentives are chosen to reinforce the propensity toward either authority or loyalty
inherent in the social incentives. Thus, not only do social incentives matter for
6Active responsibility is responsibility ex ante in the sense of taking responsibility to ensure
a particular outcome in the future. Passive responsibility is responsibility ex post in the sense
of being held responsible for an outcome in the past. See, for example, Bovens (1998).
7In a similar spirit, an experimental study by Bartling et al. (2010) documents the endogenous
emergence of two fundamentally distinct employment strategies: a control strategy and a trust
strategy. Also, a long-run study of corporate ownership by Franks et al. (2009a) describes formal
systems of regulation and informal relations of trust as alternative ways of mitigating agency
problems arising from the separation of ownership and control.
8We borrow the term braidingfrom a recent paper by Gilson et al. (2010): Parties [write]
contracts that intertwine formal and informal mechanisms what we call braiding . . . the
formal governance structure in these braided contracts complements rather than crowds out the
informal mechanisms that rely on increasing levels of trust.
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monetary incentives, but variation in social incentives by altering the optimal
mode of governance can radically change the optimal structure of monetary in-
centives. Put di¤erently, changes in informal governance structures can call for
regime switchesin formal governance structures.
Rather than optimizing monetary incentives given social incentives, gover-
nance design may involve jointly optimizing monetary and social incentives. In-
deed, many organizations carefully design the social context among their mem-
bers, for example, by selecting members based on social t or by actively shaping
corporate culture. In our model, we nd that the principals preferences with
respect to various combinations of social and monetary incentives can exhibit two
local optima, implementing an authority regime and a loyalty regime, respectively.
When this is the case, a gradualist approach changing monetary or social incen-
tives to achieve marginal improvements brings the principal closer to the nearest
local optimum, but not necessarily to the incentive system that she prefers glob-
ally. Rather, the principal may have to adopt a big bang approach to reform the
organizations mode of governance. Such bimodality and the di¢ culty of imple-
menting radical reforms is a potential cause of path dependency and inertia in
organizations.
Finally, our theory predicts that increasing the salience of social recognition
e.g., through symbolic rewards such as employee of the month and promoting
social ties e.g., through team-building activities are complementary measures
toward promoting a loyalty regime within an organization. Together, these mea-
sures foster a culture in which organizational norms, or objectives, are transparent
and trickle down the hierarchy via social ties. As a result, members at di¤erent
levels cooperate in the organizations interest on the basis of trust, rather than on
the basis of authority or monetary incentives. This is reminiscent of a well-known
quote by the organizational psychologist Rensis Likert:
The greater the loyalty of a group toward the group, the greater is the
motivation among the members to achieve the goals of the group, and
the greater the probability that the group will achieve its goals.9
9Rensis Likert was a founder and the rst director of the University of Michigans Institute
for Social Research. In the 1960s and 1970s, Likerts research on organizations signicantly in-
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The present paper paper forms part of the economic literature on the role of
social incentives in the design of contracts and organizations (e.g., Benabou and
Tirole, 2006; Ellingsen and Johannesson, 2008; Fehr et al., 2008). We here con-
tribute to this literature an examination of how social ties and social recognition
a¤ect the role of supervision in a delegated monitoring model (in the spirit of Di-
amond, 1984; Tirole, 1986; Holmstrom and Tirole, 1997). We apply the insights
from our model to family rms, gray directors, and corporate culture. We relate
our work to relevant studies on these topics in later sections.
Our paper is perhaps most closely related to Karlan et al. (2009), who also
study the role of social ties in a moral hazard setting. In their model, opportunistic
behavior causes valuable social ties to break down ex post, and the threat of such
breakdown mitigates opportunistic behavior ex ante. Thus, these authors show
that social ties can serve as collateral that overcomes conicts of interest. Our
focus is quite di¤erent. We seek to demonstrate that social ties can serve as
incentive bridges and that their impact on agency, or governance, problems is in
principle ambiguous.10
This ambivalence about social ties is standard in the sociology literature, which
has long concluded that actions need not be commendable simply because they are
facilitated by social ties. As Putnam (1996, p. 34) writes, whether or not their
shared goals are praiseworthy is . . . entirely another matter. In particular, the
sociology literature emphasizes that, while social ties can serve to bridge di¤erent
groups, they can also strengthen the bonds within a group at the expense of
relations with outsiders. These e¤ects referred to by Putnam (1993) as bridging
and bonding are precisely the opposing forces that constitute the key trade-o¤
in our model: Capture bonds the supervisor and the agent together against the
principal, whereas loyalization bridges the conict between the principal and the
agent.
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the basic model. Section
uenced the (re)design of modern Japanese organizations. Interestingly, his distinction between
authoritative and participative management systems bears close similarities to the authority
regime and the loyalty regime in our model.
10Allowing the strength of social ties to be sensitive to opportunism does not change our main
ndings. On the contrary, in Section 5.2, we show that the incentive bridge e¤ect and the
social collaterale¤ect reinforce each other.
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3 examines the role of social incentives in the case of incomplete contracts. The
interaction between monetary incentives and social incentives is examined in Sec-
tion 4. Finally, Section 5 presents our conclusions. Mathematical proofs are set
forth in the Appendix.
2 Model
2.1 Delegated Monitoring
The principal (P ) can hire an agent to implement an action on her behalf. There
are two possible actions, g and b. The principal cannot distinguish g from b, but
the agent can. Each action generates benets for the principal, P , and for the
agent, A, given by
P (g) = Xg > 0; P (b) = Xb = 0;
A (g) = Bg > 0; A (b) = ~Bb > Bg;
where ~Bb is a random variable with p.d.f.
f( ~Bb) =
(
 for ~Bb = BLb
1   for ~Bb = BHb > BLb
.
The agent privately observes the realization of ~Bb prior to choosing his action,
which the principal cannot observe. The payo¤ structure is commonly known and
induces a conict of interest over the choice between g and b: the agent strictly
prefers b, while the principal strictly prefers g.
To mitigate this agency problem, the principal can hire a supervisor (S). The
supervisor cannot freely observe whether the agents proposed action is of type b
or g. However, she can engage in monitoring, which reveals the true action with
probability 1, at a random cost ~c, with p.d.f.
g(~c) =
(
 for ~c = c
1   for ~c = c > c .
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If the supervisor monitors (e = 1) and discovers that the agent proposed b, the
supervisor can convert b to an action of type g at no cost.11 If she does not monitor
(e = 0), the agents action choice is implemented.
The supervisor privately observes the realization of ~c prior to making her
monitoring choice. The principal neither observes ~c nor the monitoring choice.
Distribution g(~c) is commonly known and, for simplicity, independent of distrib-
ution f( ~Bb). The principal may have to pay the supervisor a xed wage w  0 to
compensate for monitoring costs.
To isolate the problem of interest, we further assume that the agent and the
supervisor have no wealth (limited liability), and that the actual outcome X is
observable to the three players but not veriable by a third party (incomplete
contracts). Thus, without further constraints, the principal can neither induce
the agent to choose g, nor the supervisor to monitor. We also abstract from side
transfers between the agent and the supervisor. In Section 5.1, we will show that
our main insights are robust to collusion. All players are risk-neutral.
Finally, we make the following assumption.
Assumption 1 Xg  Xb is an order of magnitude larger than BHb + c.
The assumption implies that the e¢ cient choice for the agent is to implement
g (and for the supervisor not to monitor); and that the e¢ cient choice for the
supervisor is to monitor if (and only if) the agent chooses b.
2.2 Social Recognition and Directed Altruism
The supervisor cares about the principals opinion of her. Specically, she derives
(more) utility from being perceived by the principal as a person of high(er) in-
tegrity.12 We suppose that the supervisor ex ante promises to monitor the agents
action choice. Ex post, the principal evaluates the integrity of the supervisor by
forming a (Bayesian) belief about whether the supervisor actually kept her promise
11The assumption that the supervisor can simply alter the action is not critical. Alternatively,
we could assume that monitoring reduces the private benets associated with b such that the
agents preferences with respect to g and b are reversed (cf. Holmstrom and Tirole, 1997).
12Like Jensen (2009), we dene integrity as honoring ones word.
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and monitored the agent. We denote this belief by
Pr(e = 1 jX ) =
(
g if X = Xg
b if X = Xb
.
This integrity assessment represents the social recognition that the supervisor
receives from the principal. In the spirit of Ellingsen and Johannesson (2008),
we assume that the supervisor values this social recognition. More precisely, the
supervisors payo¤ function S is given by
S =
(
g + w   ec if X = Xg
  (1  b) + w   ec if X = Xb
.
If Xg is realized, the principal may give the supervisor some credit for this, which
is captured by g. The supervisor gets utility g from getting this credit, and we
refer to g as pride. If Xb is realized, the principal may think that the supervisor
is partly to blame for this, which is captured by 1   b. The supervisor su¤ers
disutility  (1  b) from this blame, and we refer to   (1  b) as shame.13 ;14
While this formalization of pride is intuitive the principal may partly at-
tribute a good outcome to the supervisor having done a commendable job mon-
itoring the agent, which the supervisor values the following example provides
some intuition for how shame works in the model. Note that, in the context of a
rm, we think of shareholders as P , management as A, and the board of directors
as S. Consider the shareholders of Enron faced with the rms bankruptcy (Xb).
They may have partly attributed this outcome to the fact that Enrons board of
directors had failed to do its job, i.e., to police the rms management. In the
model, (1  b) reects the probability that the shareholders attribute the col-
lapse to board negligence. Indeed, being blamed for the collapse inicted negative
13For simplicity, we assume that the agent does not care about the principals opinion of him.
Allowing the agent to care about the principals opinion mitigates the primary agency problem.
However, to the extent that it does not fully resolve this problem, the need for a supervisor
remains; our analysis characterizes the residual interaction.
14This formulation implicitly assumes that the supervisor feels pride when a favorable out-
come is realized (Xg) and shame when a negative outcome is realized (Xb). While this is the
appropriate formalization for the applications that we discuss in this paper, it should be noted
that there may be other contexts in which social recognition is conferred for negative outcomes.
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utility, or shame, on the directors. As Patrick McGurn, then Vice President at
Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS), put it, The directors of Enron are going
to carry this stigma with them.15 Note that, for our purposes, it does not matter
whether the shame is a¤ective (a purely hedonic good) or instrumental (confers
deferred material consequences).16
The supervisor and the agent exhibit altruism toward each other (but not to-
ward the principal). Given that A and S denote the agents and the supervisors
payo¤s, their other-regarding utilities are given by
uA = A + ASS and uS = S + SAA.
We assume that the altruism between the supervisor and the agent is mutual in
the sense that SA = AS = , where  reects the intensity of their personal
relationship, or friendship.17 The parameters   0 and  2 [0; 1] are, for now,
commonly known and exogenously given.
2.3 Timeline
The basic analysis takes the presence of the supervisor as given. In stage 0, the
supervisor promises to monitor and to convert a detected type b action. In stage
1, the agent privately observes the realization of ~Bb, and the supervisor privately
observes the realization of ~c. In stage 2, the agent proposes an action, and the
supervisor decides whether to monitor. If the supervisor monitors and detects
a type b action, she chooses whether to convert it. In stage 3, the action is
implemented, the outcome of the action is publicly observed, and the principal
forms beliefs about the supervisors integrity. In stage 4, all utilities are realized,
and the game ends.
15New York Times, December 16, 2001.
16The fact that a negative outcome can confer disutility implies that the supervisor can ex post
regret having taken on the job. The following quote from Richard F. Syron, former chairman
and chief executive o¢ cer of Freddie Mac, reects this notion: If I had perfect foresight, I
would never have taken this job in the rst place.New York Times, August 5, 2008.
17See, e.g., Becker (1974), Camerer (2003) and Alger and Weibull (2009).
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2.4 Equilibrium Concept
We solve the game for pure-strategy Perfect Bayesian Equilibria.
A pure strategy of the agent species an action choice for each realization of
~Bb; this is a mapping from the information set

BHb ; B
L
b
	
to the action set fg; bg.
There exist 22 = 4 strategies of which only three are relevant: to never choose g,
to choose g only when ~Bb = BLb , and to always choose g.
18 Each of these strategies
can be characterized by the probability that g is chosen, denoted by p 2 f0; ; 1g.
A pure strategy of the supervisor species a monitoring choice for each realiza-
tion of ~c; this is a mapping from the information set fc; cg to the action set f0; 1g.
There exist 22 = 4 strategies of which only three are relevant: to always monitor,
to monitor only when ~c = c, and to never monitor.19 Each of these strategies can
be characterized by the probability of monitoring, denoted by m 2 f1; ; 0g. The
supervisors decision whether to correct a detected type b action is subsumed in
her monitoring decision. It is straightforward to show that the supervisor does
not monitor unless she prefers g over b.
The principals ex post beliefs about the probability that the supervisor moni-
tored the agent are a function of the observed outcome ~X, and (when well-dened)
are given by
 (X) =
m^(X)
m^(X) + p^(X) (1  m^(X)) 
(
g if X = Xg
b if X = Xb
, (1)
where b denotes a conjecture about a variable .
A Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (henceforth, equilibrium) consists of a strategy
prole (p;m) and a set of beliefs (g; b) such that the strategies constitute best
responses given the beliefs, and the beliefs are consistent with the strategies.
18Clearly, if the agent chooses b when ~Bb = BLb , he will never choose g when the incentives
for choosing b are stronger, i.e., when ~Bb = BHb .
19Clearly, if the supervisor chooses to monitor when ~c = c, he will never choose not to monitor
when the cost of monitoring is lower, i.e., when ~c = c.
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3 The Dual E¤ect of Social Ties on Governance
3.1 Capture versus Loyalization
To gain intuition for how social ties a¤ect the incentives of the supervisor and the
agent, respectively, we look at their incentive compatibility (IC) constraints.
First, if the supervisor conjectures that the agent plays a given strategy, e.g.,
p = , the shape of her IC constraints is illustrated in Fig:1. For (; ) in region
A, the supervisor does not monitor the agent (m = 0); for (; ) in region B, she
monitors if and only if the monitoring cost is low (m = ); and for (; ) in region
C, she monitors even if the monitoring cost is high (m = 1). The horizontal line in
Fig:1 illustrates the e¤ect of friendship on the supervisors incentives to monitor,
keeping constant her desire for social recognition (). As friendship increases, the
supervisor becomes less likely to perform her duty as monitor. This is because
she internalizes more of the agents well-being, which e¤ectively increases her cost
of intervening against the agents interests. In other words, the social tie acts as
an incentive bridge, which transmits the agents incentives to the supervisor. We
refer to this e¤ect of friendship as capture.
Second, if the agent conjectures that the supervisor plays a given strategy, e.g.,
m = , the shape of his IC constraints is illustrated in Fig:2. For (; ) in region
D, the agent does not choose action g (p = 0); for (; ) in region E, he chooses g
if and only if the private benets from b are low (p = ); and for (; ) in region
F , he chooses g even if the private benets from b are high (p = 1). The horizontal
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line in Fig:2 illustrates the e¤ect of friendship on the agents incentives to choose
g, keeping constant the supervisors desire for social recognition (). As friendship
increases, the agent becomes more likely to behave well. Intuitively, as the agent
internalizes more of the supervisors well-being, he experiences more disutility if
the supervisor is blamed for a bad outcome, and hence he becomes increasingly
reluctant to choose b. In other words, the social tie acts as an incentive bridge,
which transmits the supervisors incentives to the agent. We refer to this e¤ect of
friendship as loyalization.
The trade-o¤ between capture and loyalization is critical to understanding
the e¤ect of friendship on governance, and hence is key to our results. Both ef-
fects represent a transfer of incentives: Through capture, the supervisor inherits
the interests of the agent, which are in direct conict with those of the princi-
pal. Through loyalty, the agent inherits the interests of the supervisor, which in
turn mitigates the conict between the principal and the agent. Thus, increas-
ing friendship is benecial to the principal if loyalization dominates, but adverse
otherwise.
3.2 Modes of Governance: Authority and Loyalty
An equilibrium represents a particular balance between capture and loyalization.
Since the agent and the supervisor each have three (relevant) pure strategies each,
nine strategy proles (p;m) can potentially be supported in equilibrium. However,
if the agent chooses g with certainty (p = 1), the supervisor will incur no moni-
toring cost in equilibrium. Thus, the proles (p;m) = (1; 1) and (p;m) = (1; )
can be ruled out.
Lemma 1 (Existence) For each strategy prole (p;m) =2 f(1; 1) ; (1; )g, there
exist pairs (; ) for which the prole can be supported in equilibrium.
Each of the seven equilibria inhabits a particular region in the --space, i.e.,
each equilibrium can be supported for particular combinations of desire for social
recognition and friendship.20 The principals ex ante expected utility in equilib-
20Some equilibrium regions overlap, such that their intersections admit multiple strategy pro-
les as equilibria. Nevertheless, their locations in the --space broadly determine how  and 
a¤ect the agents and the supervisors behavior.
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rium (p;m)21 is given by
E (uP )(p;m) = Xg (m+ (1 m) p) +Xb (1 m) (1  p)  w(p;m);
where w(p;m)  0.22 ;23
Proposition 1 For all , the principal prefers the equilibrium (p;m) = (1; 0).
Furthermore, there exist ^ and  > ^ such that (i) for all  2 [^; ), the principals
second most preferred equilibrium is (p;m) = (0; 1), and (ii) for all   , the
principal is indi¤erent between (p;m) = (0; 1) and (p;m) = (1; 0). These prefer-
ences over equilibria induce preferences over friendship since, for a given , there
exist  () and  () such that (p;m) = (0; 1) can be supported for all  <  (),
and (p;m) = (1; 0) can be supported for all  >  ().
The principal gets Xg with certainty in both of the equilibria (p;m) = (1; 0)
and (p;m) = (0; 1), whereas she gets Xb with some strictly positive probability
in all other equilibria. The principal prefers (p;m) = (1; 0) for all  because she
gets Xg with probability 1, at no cost; since the supervisor never monitors, there
is no need to pay her a wage.24 In contrast, because (p;m) = (0; 1) involves
monitoring, the principal (in general) has to pay the supervisor a wage. This
wage is decreasing in the supervisors desire for social recognition, so for   ^,
(p;m) = (0; 1) is the principals second most preferred equilibrium (at least).25
When   , the supervisor cares so much about social recognition that she is
willing to monitor at zero wage, so the principal is indi¤erent between the two
equilibria.
21We henceforth denote an equilibrium by its strategy prole (p;m) alone, hence suppressing
the equilibrium beliefs derived in the proof of Lemma 1.
22The wage is non-zero if it is necessary to induce the supervisors participation.
23The proof of Lemma 1 shows that the two equilibria with m = 1, (p;m) = (0; 1) and
(p;m) = (; 1), yield the same payo¤s for all players. Moreover, whenever (p;m) = (; 1) can be
supported as an equilibrium, (p;m) = (0; 1) can be as well. Therefore, without loss of generality,
we henceforth neglect (p;m) = (; 1).
24There is no need to pay the agent a wage because, as is shown in the proof of Lemma 1, when-
ever the supervisors participation constraint is satised, the agents participation constraint is
satised as well.
25The wage is decreasing in  because the supervisors pride is increasing in .
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From the second part of Proposition 1, the principals preferences with respect
to equilibria induce preferences over friendship, because her preferred equilibria
exist only for certain ranges of , given . The equilibrium (p;m) = (0; 1) exists
if and only if friendship is low or moderate ( <  ()), so that the supervi-
sors incentives to (always) monitor are not eroded by capture.26 In contrast,
(p;m) = (1; 0) exists if and only if friendship is strong enough ( >  ()), so that
loyalization induces the agent to (always) choose g.27
The equilibria (p;m) = (1; 0) and (p;m) = (0; 1) are of critical importance
for the remainder of the results presented in this paper. In both equilibria, the
principal gets Xg with certainty, yet each is built on fundamentally di¤erent logic.
In (p;m) = (0; 1), the agent always chooses b, but Xg obtains because the super-
visor always monitors the agent (and hence detects the bad action and converts
it to a good one). The supervisor intervenes because she prefers to incur mon-
itoring cost over bearing the blame for a bad outcome. Thus, the equilibrium
is inherently conictual; the agent takes an action against the interests of the
supervisor, who intervenes to prevent this action from damaging her reputation.
Because (p;m) = (0; 1) involves an active supervisor who exercises her authority
and disciplines the misbehaving agent, we henceforth refer to this equilibrium as
the authority regime. From Proposition 1, the authority regime requires some
distance between the supervisor and the agent; if they are overly close friends,
capture erodes the supervisors incentives to monitor the agent. Similarly, the
authority regime can be interpreted as a situation in which the supervisor moni-
tors because she does not trust the agent to behave well, and the agent, in turn,
misbehaves.
In contrast, in (p;m) = (1; 0), Xg is implemented even though the supervisor
never monitors the agent, because the agent cares so much for the supervisor
that he always refrains from choosing b. Although the supervisor is passive, she
fulls a key role as designated scapegoat; it is the fact that she would bear the
26Even within the range of  for which (p;m) = (0; 1) exists, any marginal increase in friend-
ship harms the principal because it induces the supervisor to require greater compensation for
disciplining the agent, i.e., it increases w(0;1).
27This equilibrium is not feasible if  () > 1. However, there exists a wide range of parameter
values such that  ()  1, and we restrict attention to these.
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blame in case of a bad outcome that induces the agent to behave well. Thus, this
equilibrium demonstrates that delegated monitoring need not be active in order to
be e¤ective. Because loyalization induces the agent to behave in the supervisors
interests here, we henceforth refer to (p;m) = (1; 0) as the loyalty regime. We
also note that, because the supervisors interests are aligned with those of the
principal, the loyalty regime represents a situation in which the agent inherits the
principals interests via the supervisor. In this precise sense, social ties between
the supervisor and the agent can serve to bridge the conict between the principal
and the agent, thereby resolving the root agency problem. By Proposition 1, the
loyalty regime can be sustained if the supervisor and the agent are close enough
friends; otherwise, the agent does not care enough about the supervisor to behave
well. Similarly, the loyalty regime can be interpreted as a situation in which the
supervisor trusts the agent to behave well, and therefore chooses not to monitor,
and the agent, in turn, honors her trust by choosing g.
In sum, both the authority and loyalty regimes achieve good governance in that
action g is implemented, yet they represent two fundamentally di¤erent modes
of governance, sitting at opposite ends of several spectra: While the authority
regime reects an inherently conictual relationship between the supervisor and
the agent, the loyalty regime entails mediation of the conicts not only between
the supervisor and the agent, but also between the principal and the agent. More-
over, while the authority regime is characterized by distance, distrust and active
supervision, the loyalty regime reects a close and trustful relationship between
the (passive) supervisor and the agent. We henceforth refer to the authority and
loyalty regimes as the two basic modes of governance.
The opposing views on the e¤ect of social ties on governance can be reconciled
in light of the two modes of governance. In the authority regime, social ties are
harmful, which lends support to the crony capitalism view that social ties under-
mine good governance. However, in the loyalty regime, social ties are benecial,
which buttresses the social capital view that social ties support good governance.
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3.3 Reputability and the Value of Social Ties
The main message of Proposition 1 is that the principal always benets from social
ties between the supervisor and the agent when they are strong enough to sustain
the loyalty regime ( >  ()).
Proposition 2 The minimum level of friendship required for the loyalty regime
to exist decreases with , i.e., @ () =@ < 0.
Proposition 2 encapsulates on of our key results: the more the supervisor
values social recognition, the more feasible is the principals preferred mode of
governance. Intuitively, holding friendship constant, if the supervisor cares more
about social recognition, the agent su¤ers more when the supervisor is blamed
for a bad outcome. As a consequence, the agent is more inclined to propose
g. This result is key because it yields an important empirical prediction: the
relationship between the quality of governance and the strength of social ties should
be ambiguous. In essence, from Proposition 2, a given  promotes good governance
if  is (su¢ ciently) high, but can undermine good governance otherwise. The
model thus predicts that when regressing governance outcomes on measures of
social ties, the e¤ect of social ties should be positive in some cases and negative in
others, in accordance with the above (and below) referenced empirical evidence.
However, in order to disentangle situations in which social ties are harmful from
those in which they are desirable, our model shows that it is critical to consider
the e¤ects of friendship and the desire for social recognition in interaction, since
social ties are more likely to promote good governance in environments where
concerns for social recognition are salient. Below, we highlight three contexts in
which this insight may be valuable.
Gray directors
An emerging literature in corporate governance assesses the role of gray directors,
i.e., non-executive members of a rms board with social ties to the CEO (Kramarz
and Thesmar, 2007; Cohen et al., 2008; Hwang and Kim, 2008; Schmidt, 2009;
18
Fracassi and Tate, 2009).28
In light of our model, social ties between a CEO and a non-executive director
may benet shareholders if the director has a high concern for social recognition
(e.g., in the market for directors), but may harm them otherwise. That is, it may
be in shareholders(P ) interests to appoint a board (S) with close social ties to
management (A), and that cares considerably about its public image (su¢ ciently
large ), in order to implement a loyalty regime in which the rm is well-managed
and the board is passive.29
This implies that, to empirically analyze the e¤ects of gray directors on gover-
nance, it may be important to interact the directors graynesswith measures of
her own reputational concerns. The idea that directors care about their reputa-
tion dates back at least to Fama (1980) and Fama and Jensen (1983); both studies
hypothesize that a directors reputation has instrumental value in the market for
directors. A number of empirical studies, which typically proxy a directors repu-
tation by her popularityin the market for directors, have found support for this
hypothesis (Gilson, 1990; Kaplan and Reishus, 1990; Brickley et al., 1999; Coles
and Hoi, 2003; Harford, 2003; Yermack, 2004; Fich, 2005).30
28Social ties are construed from background information such as alma mater, military service,
regional origin, and academic discipline.
29One possible example is the appointment of Bill Gates as a director of Berkshire Hathaway;
Bill Gates is both highly reputable and a close friend of the CEO, Warren Bu¤ett. Adams and
Ferreira (2007) provide another important reason for why friendly boardsmay be benecial:
they can enhance communication with the CEO.
30Moreover, regulators and the media increasingly demand that boards exercise meaningful
oversight and accordingly condemn directorial sloth, negligence, and misconduct. Shareholder
activists argue that such shaming sanctions constitute e¤ective penalties for directors, who are
enmeshed in small circles of corporate elites in which reputation is important. The following
example, recounted in Skeel (2001), illustrates the use of shaming as a disciplining device:
In April 1992, shareholder activist and founder of ISS, Robert Monks, in order to promote
shareholder proposals against the management of Sears, bought a full-page advertisement in the
Wall Street Journal with the title: The non-performing assets of Sears.The advertisement
presented a silhouette outline of the nine Sears directors, listing each by name and position, as
responsible for the companys poor performance. Although none of the shareholder proposals
were approved by vote, the embarrassed directors in response to the ad voluntarily adopted
several of the proposals endorsed by Monks.
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Family rms
The family rm, by construct, intertwines professional and social relationships.
The empirical evidence on the performance consequences of family ownership is
inconclusive.31 In particular, there exist substantial di¤erences across countries;
in Thailand and Korea, for example, economic growth has been driven by the
success of large family business groups (Claessens et al., 2000).
Our model suggests that this inconclusive empirical evidence may reect that
whether family managers (A), supervised by family directors (S), run rms in
the best interests of its non-family investors (P ) depends on whether a rm is
placed in a (cultural) context where social recognition plays an important role
(e.g., where the perceived value of protecting the familys nameis high). If so,
delegating management to family members may be a way of ensuring not only
that managers further the familys material interests, but also that they eschew
actions that jeopardize the familys (brand) name, which also may benet non-
family shareholders.32 This suggests that family rms should be more prevalent,
and perform better, precisely in countries where such cultural traits are more
salient. In contrast, our model suggests that family ownership may exacerbate
agency problems in contexts where social recognition is relatively less important.
A broader interpretation of our results would be that whether embedding busi-
ness decisions in a family structure is benecial for outsiders critically depends on
how the family structure itself is embedded within larger social structures. Thus,
evaluating the governance of family rms only on the basis of family ties, while
ignoring external family relationships, would be to take too narrow a view of so-
31See, e.g., La Porta et al., 1999; Faccio and Lang, 2002; Villalonga and Amit, 2006; Cronqvist
et al., 2003; Anderson and Reeb, 2003; Khanna and Palepu, 2000; and Franks et al., 2009b.
32It is typically argued that the presence of a controlling family leads to what corporate gover-
nance scholars refer to as the controlling shareholder trade-o¤ (Gilson, 2006): family ownership
may better police management because of proximity and lower information costs, but it may
also create a conict between family and non-family shareholders over the extraction of private
benets of control, which accrue to the former but not to the latter. We argue that, in a context
where social recognition is salient, this trade-o¤ need not be present; the loyalty regime resolves
all conicts of interest. Hearn and Filatotchev (2010) report evidence in support of the view
that minority investors may benet from family ownership. Masulis et al. (2009) also document
certication benets of family ownership.
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cial embeddedness.33 Interestingly, a recent study on informal family businesses
in East Africa argues that entrepreneurs not only use both strong family and
strong community ties to establish and grow businesses, but they also use strong
community ties to counterbalance the obligations that strong extended family ties
create(Khavul et al., 2009, 1).
Business networks
Economic activity is sometimes facilitated through social networks that allow
economic actors to build connections and generate business opportunities. Such
networks tend to play a particularly important role where formal institutions
are weak or unavailable, and they operate on the basis of personal relationships,
word-of-mouth recommendations, referrals, and vouchers. In fact, because of their
informal nature and the importance of norms, such networks sometimes become
an integral part of regional or national culture.
A prime example is guanxi, which is a central concept in Chinese society.
Guanxi governs the personalized networks of inuence that are drawn upon to
facilitate transactions and cooperation.34 To illustrate guanxi, we interpret an ex-
ample of Standird and Marshall (2000) in the context of our framework: A seller
(P ) and a buyer (A) want to engage in a trade with deferred payment. A third
party (S), who has ties to both parties, acts as a social intermediary (zhongjian
ren). Her role is to vouch for the buyer, informally assuring the seller that pay-
ment will be made. If the buyer fails to meet his obligation, the intermediary loses
face before the seller (and, by word of mouth, potentially before others). Given the
tie between the buyer and the intermediary, the buyer will take into account that
non-payment would damage the intermediarys reputation. The seller presumes
this, so the trade takes place. We nd this example striking in that it de facto
describes the loyalty regime; although S is passive, she enables the transaction to
33Miller and Le Breton-Miller (2005) and Le Breton-Miller and Miller (2009) provide similar
arguments to reconcile what they call the agency view and the stewardship view of the family
rm. These views broadly correspond to what we refer to as the crony capitalism view and the
social capital view.
34Similar notions also exist in other countries, e.g., Blat in Russia and Wasta in the Middle
East. As discussed in Section 3.4 below, the desirability of a business culture that relies heavily
on personal connections depends on the institutional context in which it is embedded.
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take place by putting her reputation at stake.35
3.4 Formal versus Informal Institutions
Given Proposition 1, we can also examine how the feasibility of both the author-
ity and the loyalty regimes i.e., the thresholds  () and  () depend on the
supervisors monitoring costs, ~c, and the agents benets from shirking, ~Bb. One
can interpret these parameters as measures of the quality of formal institutions; ~c
reects the weakness of the legal instruments that make monitoring more e¤ective,
and ~Bb reects the agents ability to defraud the principal.
Proposition 3 For any , (i) the feasibility of the loyalty regime is independent
of monitoring costs, (ii) the authority regime becomes less feasible, and eventu-
ally infeasible, as c increases, (iii) the loyalty regime becomes less feasible, and
eventually infeasible, as BHb increases, and (iv) the authority regime becomes less
feasible as E( ~Bb) increases.
Proposition 3 indicates which types of formal institution favor the authority
and loyalty regimes. When formal institutions are weak, in that monitoring is
costly, the authority regime becomes more di¢ cult to sustain, and possibly infea-
sible (even for  = 0). Formal institutions that are weaker in this sense make the
loyalty regime more appealing. In contrast, when formal institutions are weak in
that the scope for opportunism is large, the loyalty regime becomes more di¢ cult
to sustain, and possibly infeasible (even for  = 1). Although the authority regime
also becomes more di¢ cult to sustain, it at least remains feasible (for  = 0) pro-
vided that, of course, monitoring costs are not prohibitive. Thus, in this case, it
is the authority regime that gains appeal.
35The following Wikipedia entry (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Guanxi, accessed February 28,
2009) illustrates the similarity between guanxi and the loyalty regime in our model: Guanxi
is becoming more widely used instead of the two common translations connections and
relationships as neither of those terms su¢ ciently reect the wide cultural implications that
guanxi describes. Closely related concepts include that of ganqing, a measure which reects
the depth of feeling within an interpersonal relationship, renqing, the moral obligation to main-
tain the relationship, and the idea of face, meaning social status, propriety, prestige, or more
realistically a combination of all three.
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This is broadly consistent with the view that family rms may be a second-best
form of organization in markets with weak institutions. However, it di¤ers from
other explanations in that the costs and benets of family ownership depend not
only on the quality of formal institutions, but also on whether those institutions
primarily facilitate monitoring or constrain opportunism.36 In particular, family
ownership is more likely to be detrimental when weak institutions make it easier
to extract private benets. For instance, this may be the case when control-
enhancing mechanisms allow family owners to exert control while owning a very
small equity stake. Consistent with our view, Silva et al. (2006) nd, in a sample of
Chilean rms, that the impact of family ownership on rm performance is positive
unless the separation of ownership and control is very large. Amit et al. (2009)
nd a similar relationship in a sample of Chinese rms.
4 Braiding Monetary and Social Incentives
The above analysis highlights the role of social incentives when contracts are
incomplete and the principal cannot make wages contingent on outcome. In this
section, we study how, when wages can be made contingent on outcome, optimal
monetary incentives interact with social incentives.
4.1 Optimizing Incentive Pay given Social Incentives
Amonetary incentive scheme species what wage the principal pays the supervisor
and the agent as a function of project outcome ~X:
w( ~X) =

wA( ~X) wS( ~X)

where
w( ~X) =
(
w(Xg) if X = Xg
w(Xb) if X = Xb
.
36Other explanations are provided in Le¤(1978), Burkart et al. (2003), Almeida andWolfenzon
(2006), Khanna and Yafeh (2007).
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We are interested in how the optimal incentive scheme w( ~X) depends on the
social incentives (; ), which we (rst) treat as given.
A given social context inuences, in general, not only whom the principal
wants to incentivize, but also what particular outcome to implement. Assumption
1 simplies matters. It ensures that the principals utility from g, relative to b, is
much larger than the supervisors or the agents gains from shirking. This in turn
implies that the principals preference for action g is so strong that she is always
willing to pay the amount necessary to ensure that this action is taken, i.e., that
the chosen action yields X = Xg with certainty.
Any incentive scheme that implements X = Xg with certainty must either
incentivize the agent to always choose g (p = 1), or the supervisor to always
monitor the agent (m = 1). Either mode of governance obviates the need for
the other. Furthermore, as long as  2 [0; 1], it is cheaper to provide monetary
incentives for monitoring directly to the supervisor and monetary incentives for
project choice directly to the agent (see proof of Proposition 4). Hence, the
principal optimally provides monetary incentives either to the agent or to the
supervisor but not to both. We henceforth refer to monetary incentive schemes
targeted at the agent (supervisor) as agent-schemes (supervisor-schemes).
Our next result derives the principals preferences over these two types of
monetary incentive schemes.
Proposition 4 The outcome X = Xg can be supported without monetary incen-
tives if and only if   h1(), where h1() is a continuous function. For  < h1(),
the outcome X = Xg can be supported by both agent-schemes and supervisor-
schemes. The principal prefers supervisor-schemes if and only if   h2(), where
h2() is increasing for E(~c)  BHb and quasi-convex otherwise.
Social incentives inuence the choice of whom to provide with monetary in-
centives. For   h1(), the social incentives are su¢ ciently strong to support the
implementation of g, so that the principal need not resort to monetary incentives.
For  < h1(), the principal can induce the desired outcome through both agent-
schemes and supervisor schemes. These monetary incentive schemes are intimately
linked to the modes of governance discussed in Section 3.2. Supervisor-schemes
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support the authority regime ((p;m) = (0; 1)) by reinforcing the supervisors in-
centives to actively monitor the agent. By contrast, agent-schemes support the
loyalty regime ((p;m) = (1; 0)) by reinforcing the agents incentives to choose g.
Although the loyalty regime involves no monitoring, the supervisors presence is
important for agent-schemes because it reduces, by way of creating (some) loyalty,
the incentive pay required to align the agents interests with that of the princi-
pal. Thus, supervisor-schemes and agent-schemes di¤er in whether they support
authority or loyalty.
Whom the principal prefers to provide with monetary incentives therefore de-
pends on whether the social incentives harbor a propensity toward authority or
loyalty. Proposition 4 implies that, for a given , a higher  makes it more
attractive for the principal to incentivize the supervisor. This is because the
benets of social recognition are fully internalized by the supervisor, but only
partially internalized by the agent. In contrast, for a given , a higher  typi-
cally makes it more attractive for the principal to incentivize the agent. This is
because increased friendship makes agent-schemes less expensive, due to loyaliza-
tion, but supervisor-schemes more expensive, due to capture. However, this need
not be true when wS( ~X) is determined by the supervisors participation rather
than incentive-compatibility constraint. In this case, increasing mainly improves
the work climatein that the supervisor and the agent derive more utility from
their friendship, which in turn may allow the principal to reduce wS( ~X) without
adversely a¤ecting the supervisors monitoring incentives.37
Irrespective of the type of monetary incentive scheme, it is optimal for the
principal to set w(Xb) = 0. This allows us to summarize optimal wages as w =
w(Xg) and, with a slight abuse of notation, as a function of  given : w (; ).
When the principal implements the optimal monetary incentive scheme, w (; )
depends on social incentives in the following manner:
37In our model, this e¤ect turns out to be irrelevant for agent-schemes, because the agents
participation constraint is never binding. A recent paper by Dur and Sol (2008) puts more
emphasis on the work climatee¤ect of co-worker altruism. See also Dur (2009).
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Proposition 5 For given , optimal wages are given by
wA(; ) w

S(; )
 S 0 max f0; E(~c)  Bg   g
+S 0 maxf0; c  2+ [E( ~Bb) Bg]g
A maxf0; BHb  Bg   g 0
(2)
where  S ;
+
S ;A  [0; 1] and  S < +S < A in the strong set order.38  S is
non-empty for su¢ ciently large . +S is non-empty for intermediate , unless
h2() > h3() for all  2 [0; 1), where h3() is linearly increasing. A is non-
empty for su¢ ciently small , unless h2() < 0 for all  2 [0; 1].
Note from the various expressions in (2) that a higher  always decreases
optimal wages. This is because a stronger desire for social recognition reinforces
both modes of governance.
The impact of  on optimal wages is more complex (see Fig.3 ). The agents
wage is zero for low , where the principal optimally chooses a supervisor-scheme,
increases discontinuously at  = minA, where the principal optimally switches
to an agent-scheme, and from there gradually decreases as  increases further. In
the decreasing part, larger  strengthen loyalization so that a smaller wage su¢ ces
to fully incentivize the agent. The impact of  on the supervisors optimal wage
is as follows: For  2  S , the optimal wage is determined by the supervisors
participation constraint. Larger  improve the work climateso that a smaller
wage su¢ ces to ensure the supervisors participation. For  2 +S , the optimal
wage is determined by the supervisors incentive-compatibility constraint. Larger
 aggravate capture so that a larger wage is required to induce the supervisor to
monitor. Finally, for  2 +S , the supervisors wage drops to zero, as the principal
optimally adopts an agent-scheme.
Taken together, Propositions 4 and 5 tell us that social incentives can have
very signicant e¤ects on the optimal allocation and intensity of monetary incen-
tives. This is because variation in social incentives can alter the optimal mode of
38A set S is larger than S
0
in the strong set order if for any s 2 S and s0 2 S0, maxfs; s0g 2 S
and minfs; s0g 2 S0.
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governance. Consistent with this, Bartling et al. (2010) show experimentally that
employers either implement a control strategy, which consists of low e¤ort dis-
cretion and little or no rent-sharing akin to our authority regime implemented
through a supervisor-scheme or a trust strategy, which stipulates high e¤ort
discretion and substantial rent-sharing akin to our loyalty regime implemented
through an agent-scheme.
4.2 Optimizing Incentive Pay and Social Incentives
In reality, social contexts are often the outcome of careful deliberation. For in-
stance, many organizations select job applicants based not only on (technical)
knowledge but also on personality or social competence.39 Moreover, many orga-
nizations strive to create a specic corporate culture among their members. Or
as Milgrom and Roberts (1992) put it, important features of many organizations
can best be understood in terms of deliberate attempts to change preferences of
39For example, Fehr and Falk (2002, p.693) write: If it is true that some people are more self-
interested than others, then choosing the rightpeople is one way of a¤ecting the preferences of
a rms workforce. For this reason employers have a strong interest in recruiting employees who
have favourable preferences and whose preferences can be a¤ected in favourable ways. There is
circumstantial evidence for this because the testing and screening of employees is often as much
about the employees willingness to become a loyal rm member as it is about the employees
technical abilities.
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individual participants.
Against this background, it is instructive to recast Proposition 5 in terms of
the principals willingness to actively shape social incentives (; ). Under any
incentive scheme that implements X = Xg with certainty, the principals ex ante
and ex post utility is Xg   wA(Xg)   wS(Xg). Because the principals utility is
inversely related to the total wage, the utility depends on social incentives.
Corollary 1 For all , the principals ex ante expected utility strictly increases
with . For given , when +S ;
 
S ;A 6= ?, the principals ex ante expected utility
has two local maxima in  2 [0; 1].
Corollary 1 implies that, for reasons explained after Proposition 5, the princi-
pals willingness-to-pay for marginal increases in  is always positive, whereas it is
sometimes positive and sometimes negative for marginal increases in . When the
principals preferences are monotonic in  or , a gradualist approach, which imple-
ments marginal improvements in social incentives, inevitably brings the principal
closer to the globally optimal social incentive structure (; ) that minimizes
monetary incentives. In contrast, when +S ;
 
S ;A 6= ?, a gradualist approach
merely guarantees that the principal converges to a locally optimal social incentive
structure (Fig.3 ). In fact, gradual changes in  toward the global optimum may,
at least initially, make matters worse for the principal. In this case, the principal
may opt to be stuck in a less desirable local optimum or, otherwise, to take
radical measures to reform the organization in a big bang fashion.
Another implication of Proposition 5, which is closely related to Proposition
2, is that measures to improve  and  can reinforce each other.
Corollary 2 Given agent-schemes, as long as wA(; ) 6= 0, the principal is will-
ing to pay  for a marginal increase in  and, conversely, to pay  for a marginal
increase in .
Corollary 2 implies that the principal is willing to pay more to increase , the
larger is , and vice versa. This complementarity arises because (i) the agent
internalizes the supervisors desire for social recognition in proportion with the
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strength of their friendship, and (ii) their friendship inuences the agents incen-
tives in proportion with the degree to which the supervisor cares about social
recognition. In other words, boosting social recognition and promoting social ties
can be mutually reinforcing measures toward implementing a loyalty regime in
organizations.
Large  may describe organizations that not only articulate organizational
values or standards of excellence, but also symbolically reward adherence to
these norms, for example, by naming and showcasing the manager of the month.
The more recognition given to such managers i.e., the more ostensibly good per-
formance is praised the stronger are the social incentives for managers to earn
this distinction. Large  may describe organizations that promote social inter-
actions between managers and their subordinates, for example, through team-
building activities, integrated workplace infrastructure, or perquisites such as
membership in a (common) gym or golf club.40 Such features strengthen social
ties across the various levels of an organization.
By Corollary 2, either of these measures i.e., ostensibly praising good per-
formance and promoting the development of social ties becomes more e¤ective,
and hence more attractive, in the presence of the other. Together, these measures
promote a culture of loyalty, in which employees and their superiors cooperate
on the basis of trust, rather than on the basis of authority or purely monetary
incentives. This loyalty regime generates corporate culture top-down: It relies on
organizational norms to which key members are explicitly held accountable
and social networks, through which the incentives to adhere to these norms are
inherited by the other members. Thus, the norms trickle down the hierarchy.
5 Robustness
In this section, we relax two assumptions and show that our main conclusions are
robust. First, we allow for the possibility that the agent can bribe the supervisor
to act against the principals interest. Second, we allow the strength of friendship
40As Homans (1950) points out, social ties can strengthen from a mere increase in the frequency
of interaction: [T]he more frequently persons interact with one another, the stronger their
sentiments of friendship for one another(p.133).
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to be a¤ected by the supervisors and the agents decisions.
5.1 Possibility of Collusion
Allowing for collusion between the agent and the supervisor does not a¤ect the
viability of the loyalty regime. Quite the contrary, the threat of collusion under-
mines only the authority regime and hence increases the relative appeal of the
loyalty regime.
In the loyalty regime, the agent need not bribe the supervisor to abstain from
monitoring the supervisor is already passive. In fact, the agent voluntarily be-
haves well to avert shame from the passive supervisor. The agent might consider
a side transfer only as compensation for the shame that his misbehavior would
inict upon the supervisor; in other words, as a way of appeasing his conscience.
However, this is never the case. Consider the case of incomplete contracts. In the
loyalty regime, the incentive-compatibility constraint
Bg  Bb    (3)
is satised for the agent. Consider now the following deviation: the agent misbe-
haves and transfers a fraction,  2 (0; 1], of his benets to the supervisor. The
agents utility would then be
(1  )Bb +  (Bb   ) = Bb     (1  )Bb (4)
which is strictly smaller than the right-hand side of (3) for all  2 [0; 1). Thus, a
loyal agent prefers to abstain from misbehavior even if he could compensate the
supervisor through a side transfer.
In the authority regime, the supervisor always monitors the agents behavior;
that is, the incentive-compatibility constraint
+ Bg   c  Bb    (5)
is satised for the supervisor. Suppose that the agent asks the supervisor to
abstain from monitoring in exchange for a bribe, t. Adding t to the right-hand
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side of (5) and rearranging the inequality, we nd that the supervisor deems such
a proposition worthwhile if and only if
t  2   (Bb  Bg)  c  t. (6)
At the same time, it can be shown that the agent nds it worthwhile to bribe the
supervisor if and only if Bb   t    Bg +  (  c), or
t  (Bb  Bg)  2+ c  t. (7)
There exists a mutually benecial bribe t if and only if t  t. Using (6) and (7),
this condition can be rewritten as
(Bb  Bg)      c. (8)
The left-hand side of (8) represents the utility of a non-altruistic supervisor who
does not monitor and who receives a non-altruistic agents entire gain (from im-
plementing b as opposed to g) as a bribe. The right-hand side of (8) represents the
utility of a non-altruistic supervisor who monitors the agent and does not receive
a bribe. Intuitively, condition (8) tells us that there exists a bribe that can under-
mine the authority regime yet only when such a bribe also exists in the absence
of friendship. Since this is possible under certain parameters, we conclude that
the loyalty regime is more robust to collusion than the authority regime. That
is, collusion undermines governance regimes that rely on (third-party) monitoring
but not those that are built on trust.
5.2 Vulnerable Friendship
It is plausible to assume that, when the agent or the supervisor takes an action
against the others interest, their friendship is partly weakened. Suppose that, if
the agent exploiting the absence of monitoring to choose b were to disappoint
the supervisors trust in him, the strength of friendship decreases from  to 0 < .
One would expect that this risk of losing a friend further reduces the agents
incentive to misbehave. However, the agents incentive-compatibility constraint
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for the loyalty regime becomes
Bg  Bb   0 (9)
which, contrary to what one might expect, is tighter than the corresponding
constraint under invariant friendship [(3)]. We obtain this counterintuitive re-
sult because we abstract from friendship benets that accrue outside of the
supervisor-agent relationship. In the absence of such benets, the loss of friend-
ship after imposing a disutility on the (former) friend is benecial only as the
disutility is internalized to a lesser degree. In the presence of such benets, the
loss of friendship per se becomes costly.
When the strength of friendship is invariant, it is without loss of generality to
abstract from these outsidebenets, as these would cancel out in the incentive-
compatibility and participation constraints. Yet, when friendship is vulnerable,
incorporating these benets is important inasmuch as they represent the cost of
losing the friendship. For instance, let ZS denote the supervisors utility from
activities outside the delegated monitoring relationship. As a result, the agents
incentive-compatibility constraint for the loyalty regime becomes
Bg  Bb   0  (  0)ZS. (10)
There are now two forces that make the agent (more) loyal, which are captured
by 0 and (  0)ZS, respectively. As above, the agent partly internalizes the
shame that his misbehavior imposes on the supervisor. In addition, the agent
would partly lose the supervisors friendship if he were to betray her trust.
Similarly, suppose that friendship decreases from  to 0 < , if the supervisor
interferes with the agents decision. Let ZA denote the agents utility from ac-
tivities outside the delegated monitoring relationship. The supervisors incentive-
compatibility constraint for the authority regime then becomes
+ 0Bg   (  0)ZA   c  Bb   . (11)
The supervisor is now reluctant to discipline the agent for two reasons. First, she
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would partly internalize the decrease in agent benets. Second, she would partly
lose the agents friendship if she were to intervene against the agents interests.
Thus, the risk of losing a friend would reinforce both loyalization and capture,
and hence the conclusions from the analysis with invariant friendship.
6 Conclusion
This paper studies a governance problem that is embedded in a social structure:
a principal hires a supervisor to monitor an agent, yet the supervisor and the
agent may be connected through social ties, i.e., be friends.We analyze how
this friendship a¤ects the supervisors and the agents behavior, as well as the
principals utility, across di¤erent settings where we vary the supervisors desire
for social recognition. On one hand, friendship undermines the supervisors in-
centives to monitor the agent (capture). On the other hand, friendship makes the
agent reluctant to place the supervisor in a bad light, and thereby more likely to
voluntarily act in the principals interest (loyalization). The e¤ect on the principal
is therefore ambiguous.
We show that the principal prefers one of two fundamentally di¤erent modes
of governance. In the authority regime, the agent is fully opportunistic, but the
supervisor actively monitors the agent. This regime is built on distance, distrust,
and conict. In the loyalty regime, the agent chooses the principals preferred
action, and the supervisor only assumes passive responsibility. This regime is
built on proximity, trust, and mediation. The loyalty regime is easier to achieve
when the supervisors desire for social recognition is stronger. Thus, the e¤ect of
social ties critically depends on the salience of reputational concerns.
Our theory unies opposing views on the relationship between social ties and
governance. The basic tenet is that social ties merely serve to transfer incentives
between people, and hence are per se neutral. Whether social ties promote or
undermine good governance depends purely on which type of incentives are being
transferred. We discuss the implications of our analysis for family rms, gray
directors, business networks, and organizational culture.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1
We can abstract from the participation constraints and only take the incentive compatibility constraints into
account. This is because by the proof of Proposition 1 below, S will be given a xed wage w in any equilibrium
where this is necessary to satisfy her participation constraint, which in turn will guarantee that As participation
constraint is satised. Since the xed wage does not a¤ect the parameter values for which the respective equilibria
can be sustained, the participation constraints can be abstracted from here.
After having observed the realization of ~Bb, Bb, the agent chooses g i¤
Bg +  (g   m^E (~c jS monitors ))  m^ [Bg +  (g   E (~c jS monitors ))] (ICA)
+(1  m^) [Bb +  [  (1  b)]] .
After having observed the realization of ~c, c, the supervisor monitors i¤
g   c+ Bg  p (g + Bg) + (1  p)

  (1  b) + E

~Bb jA proposed b

(ICS)
, c  (1  p)  (1  b + g)   (1  p)

E

~Bb jA proposed b

 Bg

.
Equilibria in which m = 1
Conjecture that m = 1. Then, the agent is indi¤erent between g and b, since (ICA) reduces to
Bg +  (g   E (~c jS monitors )) = Bg +  (g   E (~c jS monitors )) .
(ICS) is given by
c  (1  p)  (1  b + g)   (1  p)

E

~Bb jA proposed b

 Bg

. (IC0S)
From (1), it follows that g = 1 (on the equilibrium path) and b 2 [0; 1] (o¤ the equilibrium path). We
know that m 6= 1 if p = 1. Hence, only two cases are distinguishable:
Case 1: Conjecture that p = 0. Then E

~Bb jA proposed b

= E

~Bb

. Substituting the beliefs and
conjectures into (ICS) yields that m = 1 is supported in equilibrium i¤
c   (2  b)  
h
E

~Bb

 Bg
i
,   c
2  b
+

h
E

~Bb

 Bg
i
2  b
. (12)
For any beliefs such that the supervisor prefers to incur the monitoring costs, she also prefers to convert a
detected type b action, by implication. To see this, note that
g + Bg    (1  b) + E

~Bb

,  

h
E

~Bb

 Bg
i
(2  b)
,
which is implied by (12). In other words, it is individually rational for a supervisor who makes an e¤ort to detect
a type b action to also convert a type b action. Given that the principal assumes individual rationality on part
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of the supervisor, we can therefore eliminate all o¤-equilibrium beliefs such that b > 0. This renement relies
only on the mutual presumption of individual rationality.
Substituting b = 0 into (12) yields that m = 1 is supported in equilibrium i¤
  c
2
+

h
E

~Bb

 Bg
i
2
. (13)
Hence, for (; ) satisfying (13), f(p;m) = (0; 1) ; g = 1; b = 0g is a PBE.
Case 2: Conjecture that p = . Then E

~Bb jA proposed b

= BHb . Substituting the beliefs and conjec-
tures into (IC0S) yields that m = 1 is supported in equilibrium i¤
c   (1  ) (2  b)   (1  )

BHb  Bg

,   c
(1  ) (2  b)
+

 
BHb  Bg

2  b
. (14)
An argument analogous to the above, again, yields that only b = 0 under mutual presumption of individual
rationality. Substituting b = 0 into (14) yields that m = 1 is supported in equilibrium i¤
  c
2 (1  ) +

 
BHb  Bg

2
(15)
Hence, for (; ) satisfying (15), f(p;m) = (; 1) ; g = 1; b = 0g is a PBE.
As will be shown in the proof of Proposition 1 below, the two equilibria with full monitoring, f(p;m) = (0; 1) ; g = 1; b = 0g
and f(p;m) = (; 1) ; g = 1; b = 0g, yield the same payo¤s for all players. Moreover, note that (15) implies (13).
That is, whenever f(p;m) = (; 1) ; g = 1; b = 0g is an equilibrium, f(p;m) = (0; 1) ; g = 1; b = 0g can also be
supported as an equilibrium. Therefore, without loss of generality, we henceforth neglect f(p;m) = (; 1) ; g = 1; b = 0g.
Equilibria in which m = 
Conjecture that m = . By (ICS), this is the case when
c  (1  p)  (1  b + g)   (1  p)

E

~Bb jA proposed b

 Bg

 c. (IC00S)
Whenever m 6= 1, (ICA) reduces to
Bg +  (g + 1  b)  Bb; (IC00A)
where Bb is a realization of ~Bb.
We know that m 6=  if p = 1. Hence, only two cases are distinguishable:
Case 1: Conjecture that p = 0. Then E

~Bb jA proposed b

= E

~Bb

. Furthermore, it follows from (1)
that g = 1 and b = 0. Substituting the beliefs and conjectures into (IC00S) yields that m =  is supported in
equilibrium i¤
c+ 

E

~Bb

 Bg

2
  
c+ 

E

~Bb

 Bg

2
. (16)
To support p = 0 in equilibrium, (IC00A) must hold for both realizations of ~Bb. Substituting the beliefs and
conjectures into (IC00A) yields that p = 0 is supported in equilibrium i¤
  B
L
b  Bg
2
. (17)
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The boundary expressions in (16) are linearly increasing in , whereas the RHS in (17) is a downward-sloping
hyperbola in . Hence, there exist (; ) that satisfy both (16) and (17), such that f(p;m) = (0; ) ; g = 1; b = 0g
is a PBE.
Case 2: Conjecture that p = . Then E

~Bb jA proposed b

= BHb . Furthermore, it follows from (1) that
g =

+(1 ) and b = 0. Substituting the beliefs and conjectures into (IC
00
S) yields that m =  is supported
in equilibrium i¤
c= (1  ) +   BHb  Bg
(2 +  (1  )) = ( +  (1  ))   
c= (1  ) +   BHb  Bg
(2 +  (1  )) = ( +  (1  )) (18)
Substituting the beliefs and conjectures into (IC00A) yields that p =  is supported in equilibrium i¤
BLb  Bg
(2 +  (1  ))= ( +  (1  ))   
BHb  Bg
(2 +  (1  ))= ( +  (1  )) . (19)
Note that in both 18 and 19, the denominator is equal to (1 + g).
The boundary expressions in (18) are linearly increasing in , whereas in (19) they are downward-sloping hy-
perbolas in . Hence, there exist (; ) that satisfy both (18) and (19), such that
n
(p;m) = (; ) ; g =

+(1 ) ; b = 0
o
is a PBE.
Equilibria in which m = 0
By (ICS), this is the case when
c  (1  p)  (1  b + g)   (1  p)

E

~Bb jA proposed b

 Bg

, (IC000S )
and as m 6= 1, (ICA) reduces to (IC00A). Three cases are distinguishable.
Case 1: Conjecture that p = 0. Then E

~Bb jA proposed b

= E

~Bb

. Furthermore, it follows from (1)
that b = 0 (on the equilibrium path) and g 2 [0; 1] (o¤ the equilibrium path). Substituting the beliefs and
conjectures into (IC000S ) yields that m = 0 is supported in equilibrium i¤
 
c+ 

E

~Bb

 Bg

1 + g
(20)
To support p = 0 in equilibrium, (IC00A) must hold for both realizations of ~Bb. Substituting the beliefs and
conjectures into (IC00A) yields that p = 0 is supported in equilibrium i¤
  B
L
b  Bg
 (1 + g)
. (21)
There exist multiple equilibria depending on g . We cannot apply the previous argument to restrict o¤-
equilibrium beliefs, since the supervisors incentive-compatibility constraint with respect to overturning a detected
type b action,
g + Bg   + E

~Bb

,  (1 + g)  

E

~Bb

 Bg

,
is implied by neither of the equilibrium conditions (20) and (21). Yet, this is not of great concern because, in
this particular equilibrium, the presence of the supervisor generates zero benets for the principal. That is, it is
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equivalent to the outcome without a supervisor, which is always feasible.
The RHS in (20) is linearly increasing in , whereas the RHS in (21) is a downward-sloping hyperbola in .
Hence, there exist (; ) that satisfy (20) and (21), such that f(p;m) = (0; 0) ; g : g 2 [0; 1] ; b = 0g constitute
PBE.
Case 2: Conjecture that p = . Then E

~Bb jA proposed b

= BHb . Furthermore, it follows from (1)
that g = 0 and b = 0. Substituting the beliefs and conjectures into (IC000S ) yields that m = 0 is supported in
equilibrium i¤
  c
1   + 

BHb  Bg

(22)
Substituting the beliefs and conjectures into (IC00A) yields that p =  is supported in equilibrium i¤
BLb  Bg

   B
H
b  Bg

(23)
The RHS in (22) is linearly increasing in , whereas the boundary expressions in (23) are downward-sloping
hyperbolas in . Hence, there exist (; ) that satisfy (22) and (23), such that f(p;m) = (; 0) ; g = 0; b = 0g
is a PBE.
Case 3:Conjecture that p = 1. It follows from (1) that g = 0 (on the equilibrium path) and b 2 [0; 1]
(o¤ the equilibrium path). Substituting the beliefs and conjectures into (IC000S ) yields that m = 0 is supported in
equilibrium i¤
c  0;
which holds by assumption. To support p = 1 in equilibrium, (IC00A) must hold for both realizations of ~Bb.
Substituting the beliefs and conjectures into (IC00A) yields that p = 1 is supported in equilibrium i¤
  B
H
b  Bg
 (1  b)
(24)
An argument analogous to the above, again, yields that only b = 0 under mutual presumption of individual
rationality. In particular, note that the supervisors incentive-compatibility constraint for overturning a detected
type b action,
g + Bg    (1  b) + E

~Bb

,  


E

~Bb

 Bg

1  b
,
is implied by the equilibrium condition (24) for  2 (0; 1]:
  B
H
b  Bg
 (1  b)
>
E

~Bb

 Bg
 (1  b)

E

~Bb

 Bg
(1  b)



E

~Bb

 Bg

(1  b)
:
Substituting b = 0 into (24) yields that p = 1 is supported in equilibrium i¤
  B
H
b  Bg

(25)
Hence, for (; ) satisfying (25), f(p;m) = (1; 0) ; g = 0; b = 0g is a PBE. 
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Proof of Proposition 1
First, the principals and the supervisors ex ante expected utilities in each equilibrium, before any wages are
paid to the supervisor, are calculated. In an equilibrium where strategies (p;m) are played, denote these expected
utilities E (uP )
 w
(p;m)
and E (uS)
 w
(p;m)
, respectively.
In the equilibria f(p;m) = (0; 1) ; g = 1; b = 0g and (p;m) = f(; 1) ; g = 1; b = 0g,
E (uP )
 w
(0;1)
= Xg
E (uS)
 w
(0;1)
=   [c+ (1  ) c] + + Bg :
In the equilibrium f(p;m) = (0; ) ; g = 1; b = 0g,
E (uP )
 w
(0;)
= Xg + (1  )Xb
E (US)
 w
(0;)
=  (  c+ Bg) + (1  ) (E (Bb)  ) :
In the equilibrium
n
(p;m) = (; ) ; g =

+(1 ) ; b = 0
o
,
E (uP )
 w
(;)
= Xg + (1  ) [Xg + (1  )Xb]
E (uS)
 w
(;)
= 



 +  (1  )   c+ Bg

+ (1  )





 +  (1  ) + Bg

+ (1  )

BHb   

=  + Bg ( +  (1  ))  c+ (1  ) (1  )BHb   (1  ) (1  ) 
=    c  (1  ) (1  ) + 
h
(1  ) (1  )BHb +Bg ( +  (1  ))
i
.
In the equilibria f(p;m) = (0; 0) ; g : g 2 [0; 1] ; b = 0g,
E (uP )
 w
(0;0)
= Xb
E (uS)
 w
(0;0)
=  + 

BLb + (1  )BHb

:
In the equilibrium f(p;m) = (; 0) ; g = 0; b = 0g,
E (uP )
 w
(;0)
= Xg + (1  )Xb
E (uS)
 w
(;0)
=   (1  ) + 
h
Bg + (1  )BHb
i
:
In the equilibrium f(p;m) = (1; 0) ; g = 0; b = 0g,
E (uP )
 w
(1;0)
= Xg
E (uS)
 w
(1;0)
= Bg :
Second, the principals ex ante utility, after having paid the supervisor a wage when needed, is calculated.
Henceforth, we refer to the equilibrium f(p;m) = (0; 1) ; g = 1; b = 0g as (p;m) = (0; 1), and so on. Let w(p;m)
denote the wage that the principal pays to the supervisor in equilibrium (p;m). If the principal must pay the
supervisor a positive wage to ensure the latters participation, she pays just enough to make the supervisor break
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even:
w(p;m) =
(
 E (S) w(p;m) if E (S) w(p;m) < 0
0 otherwise
.
Hence, the principals ex ante utility is given by E (uP )(p;m) = E (uP )
 w
(p;m)
  w(p;m).
We note that here when w(p;m) > 0, the supervisors participation constraint is binding, and when w(p;m) =
0, we have that E (S)(p;m)  0. This implies that the agents participation constraint is always satised for
  1, as E (uA) = A + S = E (B) +  (E (uS)  E (B)) =
 
1  2E (B) + E (uS)  0, where E(B)
denotes the agents expected benets.
Claim 1
The claim that the equilibrium with full loyalty, (p;m) = (1; 0), is the principals preferred equilibrium for all 
is proven.
The above calculations yield that in all equilibria, E (UP )
 w
(p;m)
is a convex combination of Xb = 0 and
Xg > 0. Hence, the equilibria (p;m) = (0; 1), and (p;m) = (1; 0) yield the principals highest ex ante pre-wage
expected utility, Xg . Since E (US)
 w
(1;0)
= Bg > 0, w(1;0) = 0 for all . Hence, E (UP )(1;0) = Xg . This
is strictly preferred to (p;m) = (0; 1) whenever w(0;1) > 0, and weakly preferred to (p;m) = (0; 1) whenever
w(0;1) = 0. Since E (UP )
 w
(p;m)
are non-degenerate convex combinations of Xb and Xg for all equilibria except
(p;m) = (1; 0) and (p;m) = (0; 1), the equilibrium (p;m) = (1; 0) is always strictly preferred to all equilibria
(p;m) =2 f(1; 0) ; (0; 1)g, irrespective of w(p;m).
Claim 2
The claim that for   , the principal is indi¤erent between (p;m) = (0; 1) and (p;m) = (1; 0) is proven. Recall
from above that E (uS)
 w
(0;1)
=  E (~c) + + Bg . If     E (~c)  Bg , then E (uS) w(0;1)  0. In this case, the
principal need not pay a wage, so that w(0;1) = 0 and E (UP )(0;1) = Xg = E (UP )(1;0).
Claim 3
The claim that there exists a ^ <  such that for all  2 [^; ), the principals second most preferred equilibrium
is (p;m) = (0; 1) is proven.
Let  < , i.e.,  < E (ec)  Bg . Then, w(0;1) = E (ec)  Bg    > 0, and
E (UP )(0;1) = E (UP )
 w
(0;1)
  w(0;1) = Xg   (E (ec)  Bg   ) < Xg .
As w(0;1) is decreasing in ,
!   ) E (UP )(0;1) ! Xg . (26)
Since E (UP )
 w
(p;m)
are non-degenerate convex combinations ofXb and Xg for all equilibria (p;m) =2 f(1; 0) ; (0; 1)g,
it follows that E (UP )(p;m) < Xg for all equilibria (p;m) =2 f(1; 0) ; (0; 1)g. Given this, it follows from (26) that
there exists a unique ^ <  such that E (UP )(0;1) > E (UP )(p;m) for all (p;m) =2 f(1; 0) ; (0; 1)g if and only if
 > ^. That is, (p;m) = (0; 1) is strictly preferred to any other equilibrium (p;m) =2 f(1; 0) ; (0; 1)g if and only if
 > ^.
Claim 4
Comparing the conditions in the proof of Lemma 1 yields  ()  2 c
[E( ~Bb) Bg]
and  () =
BHb  Bg

. 
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Proof of Proposition 2
@()
@
= @
@

BHb  Bg


=    BHb  Bg =2 < 0. 
Proof of Proposition 3
First, to see that, for any , the range of  for which the full monitoring equilibrium exists decreases in c, note
that @ () =@c =  
h
E

~Bb

 Bg
i 1
< 0. Second, we need to show that, for a given  <  (), the principals
utility in a full monitoring equilibrium decreases in E(~c). For (p;m) = (0; 1), by the proof of Proposition 1, we
have that
E (uP )(0;1) = E (uP )
 w
(0;1)
  w(0;1) =
(
Xg   [  ( E(~c) + + Bg)] if     E(~c)  Bg
Xg if  >   E(~c)  Bg
.
For  > , @E(uP )
@E(~c)
= 0. The result follows from (i) for   , @E(uP )
@E(~c)
=  1 < 0 and (ii) @=@E(~c) > 0.
Thus, @E(uP )
@E(~c)
 0 for (p;m) = (0; 1).
Third, note that both  () =

BHb  Bg


and E (uP )(0;1) = Xg are independent of monitoring costs. Thus,
neither the range for which the full loyalty equilibrium exists nor the principals utility in this equilibrium depend
on (the distribution of) monitoring costs.
Finally, note that @ () =@E

~Bb

=   2 c
[E( ~Bb) Bg]2
< 0 and @ () =  1 > 0. 
Proof of Proposition 4
Optimal shape of incentive contracts
Lemma 2 The principal optimally provides monetary incentives either to the supervisor or to the agent.
Proof. Under any incentive scheme that implements X = Xg with certainty, at least one of the following must
be true: p = 1 or m = 1. If the incentive scheme implements m = 1, the agent is indi¤erent between choosing
g and b. Hence, to implement an equilibrium (p;m) = (; 1), the agent need not be incentivized. Similarly, to
implement an equilibrium (p;m) = (1; ), the supervisor need not be incentivized.
Lemma 3 Irrespective of whom the principal provides with monetary incentives, it is always optimal for the
principal to set w(Xb) = 0.
Proof. Suppose that the principal implements (p;m) = (1; 0). In this equilibrium, the agents incentive-
compatibility constraint is given by
wA(Xg) +Bg  wA(Xb) +BHb   . (27)
It is straightforward to see that setting wA(Xb) = 0 must be optimal for the principal. It relaxes the constraint
such that the principal can set a lower wA(Xg) to ensure incentive-compatibility. This also implies that the
total expected wage paid in equilibrium becomes smaller. In this equilibrium, all participation constraints are
satised.
Suppose that the principal implements (p;m) = (0; 1). In this equilibrium, the supervisors incentive-
compatibility constraint is given by
wICS (Xg)  wICS (Xb)  c  2+ 
h
E

~Bb

 Bg
i
. (28)
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It is straightforward to see that setting wS(Xb) = 0 relaxes the constraint such that the principal can set a
lower wS(Xg) to ensure incentive-compatibility. That is, the total expected wage needed to satisfy incentive-
compatibility becomes smaller. Further note that, in the equilibrium (p;m) = (0; 1), the outcome X = Xb is
never obtained. Hence, wS(Xb) does not enter, i.e. is irrelevant for, the supervisors participation constraint.
Lemma 4 If the principal implements (p;m) = (1; 0) by incentivizing the agent, the optimal compensation
scheme is given by wS( ~X) = 0 and
wA( ~X) =
(
max

BHb  Bg   ; 0
	
if X = Xg
0 if X = Xb
. (29)
If the principal implements (p;m) = (0; 1) by incentivizing the supervisor, the optimal compensation scheme is
given by wA( ~X) = 0 and
wS( ~X) =
(
max
n
c  2+ [E

~Bb

 Bg ]; E(~c)  Bg   ; 0
o
if X = Xg
0 if X = Xb
. (30)
Proof. Setting wA(Xb) = 0 in (27) reduces the agents incentive-compatibility constraint to
wA(Xg)  BHb  Bg   . (31)
Note that (p;m) = (1; 0) can be implemented without any monetary incentives if this inequality holds for
wA(Xg) = 0. This proves the rst part.
Similarly, setting wS(Xb) = 0 in (28) reduces the supervisors incentive-compatibility constraint to
wICS (Xg)  c  2+ 
h
E

~Bb

 Bg
i
. (32)
To ensure that the supervisors participation constraint is satised, the principal must further set wS(Xg) such
that
wPCS (Xg) +   E(~c) + Bg  0. (33)
Hence, the optimal wage depends on which of the two previous inequalities is binding. Note that (p;m) = (0; 1)
can be implemented without any monetary incentives if both of the inequalities hold for wICS (Xg) = w
PC
S (Xg) =
0. This proves the second part.
Choice of whom to incentivize
First, we derive the function h1(). From Lemma 4, it follows that wA(Xg) = 0 if and only if
  B
H
b  Bg

 ha1(). (34)
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It also follows that wS(Xg) = 0 if and only if max
n
c+ [E

~Bb

 Bg ]  2;E(~c)  Bg   
o
 0. The rst
element is negative when
0  c+ [E

~Bb

 Bg ]  2
 
c+ [E

~Bb

 Bg ]
2
 hb1(), (35)
whereas the second element is negative when
0  E(~c)  Bg   
  E(~c)  Bg  hc1(). (36)
When  satises only one of the inequalities (35) and (36), the associated wage is negative for the inequality that
is satised but positive for the other inequality. Thus, the max operator selects the (positive) element associated
with the inequality that is not satised. This implies that, when the principal incentivizes the supervisor, the
outcome X = Xg can be implemented with wS(Xg) = 0 if and only if
  max
n
hb1(); h
c
1()
o
. (37)
Combining (34) and (37), we conclude that the principal can implement X = Xg either by incentivizing the
supervisor or the agent whenever
  h1()  min
n
ha1();max
n
hb1(); h
c
1()
oo
.
Since ha1(), h
b
1(), and h
c
1() are continuous, h1() is continuous. This proves the rst part of the proposition.
For all  < h1(), the principal must pay either the agent or the supervisor a positive incentive wage. It
follows from Lemma 4 that, for all  < h1(), the principal prefers incentivizing the supervisor (i.e., implementing
(p;m) = (0; 1)) over incentivizing the agent (i.e., implementing (p;m) = (1; 0)) if and only if
BHb  Bg     max
n
c+ 
h
E

~Bb

 Bg
i
  2;E(~c)  Bg   
o
. (38)
Using the rst element, this inequality becomes
BHb  Bg     c+ 
h
E

~Bb

 Bg
i
  2
 

h
E

~Bb

 Bg
i
+ c   BHb  Bg
2    h
a
2(), (39)
whereas, using the second element, it becomes
BHb  Bg     E(~c)  Bg   
  E(~c) B
H
b
1   +Bg  h
b
2(). (40)
When  satises only one of the inequalities (39) and (40), the associated supervisor wage is smaller than the
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agent wage for the inequality that is satised, but larger for the other inequality. Thus, the max operator selects
the supervisor wage that is larger than the agent wage, i.e., the one associated with the inequality that is not
satised. Hence, when  satises only one of the inequalities (39) and (40), inequality (38) is satised and the
principal incentivizes the agent.
From the above it follows that the principal prefers incentivizing the supervisor if and only if
  h2()  max
n
ha2(); h
b
2()
o
. (41)
Since ha2() and h
b
2() are continuous in [0; 1), h2() is continuous in [0; 1).
Shape of h2()
The shape of h2() depends on the shapes of ha2() and h
b
2().
Lemma 5 ha2() is strictly increasing.
Proof. The function ha2() is continuously di¤erentiable in [0; 2]. Furthermore, h
a
2(0) =
 
c BHb +Bg

=2 and
lim!2 ha2() =1. We want to show that it is strictly increasing in this interval. Consider any pair (0; 0) such
that 0 = ha2(
0), which by construction requires that wA(Xg) = wICS (Xg), i.e.
BHb  Bg   00 = c+ 0[E

~Bb

 Bg ]  20. (42)
The LHS is decreasing in 0, whereas the RHS is increasing in 0. Thus, keeping 0 xed, it must be that, for all
 > 0,
BHb  Bg   0 < c+ [E

~Bb

 Bg ]  20, (43)
or wA(Xg) < wICS (Xg). By construction, this implies that 
0 < ha2() for  > 
0. By the same token, keeping 0
xed, it must be that, for all  < 0,
BHb  Bg   0 > c+ [E

~Bb

 Bg ]  20, (44)
or wA(Xg) > wICS (Xg). By construction, this implies that 
0 > ha2() for all  < 
0. Taken together, these
observations imply that ha2 () is strictly increasing everywhere.
Lemma 6 hb2() is increasing if E(~c)  BHb and strictly decreasing otherwise.
Proof. @hb2()=@ = E(~c) BHb .
For E(~c)  BHb , it follows from the two previous lemmas that h2() is increasing. For E(~c) < BHb , we
must distinguish two cases. If hb2(0) < h
a
2(0), it follows from the two previous lemmas that h
b
2() < h
a
2()
for all  2 [0; 1). By contrast, if hb2(0) > ha2(0), then there exists a unique  2 (0; 1) such that the two
functions intersect, hb2(
) = ha2(
). In this case, h2() strictly decreases for  2 [0; ] and strictly increases
for  2 [; 1]. Thus, h2() is quasi-convex. This proves the second and the third part of the proposition. 
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Proof of Proposition 5
Table 2 can be constructed from Lemma 4. For completeness, note the following comparative statics: For strictly
positive wages, we have that
@
@
wA(Xg) =   < 0; @
@
wPCS (Xg) =  1 < 0; and
@
@
wICS (Xg) =  2 < 0
as well as that
@
@
wA(Xg) =   < 0; @
@
wPCS (Xg) =  Bg < 0; and
@
@
wICS (Xg) = E

~Bb

 Bg > 0.
That is, the optimal wage is always decreasing in , and it is also decreasing in  unless the principal incentivizes
the supervisor through wICS .
To determine  S ;, we must nd the region in which (i) the supervisor is incentivized and (ii) the optimal
wage is given by wPCS (Xg). From Proposition 4, we know that condition (i) is satised when   h2(). Condition
(ii) is satised when wICS (Xg)  wPCS (Xg), i.e.
c+ [E

~Bb

 Bg ]  2  E(~c)  Bg   
  E

~Bb

+ c  E(~c)  h3(). (45)
Note that h3() is an a¢ ne function with a positive intercept, c   E(~c), and a positive slope, E

~Bb

. Thus,
conditions (i) and (ii) are both satised for all   maxfh2(); h3()g, i.e., for su¢ ciently large .
To determine +S , we must nd the region in which (i) the supervisor is incentivized and (iii) the optimal
wage is given by wICS (Xg). From the preceding arguments, it is clear that the conditions (i) and (iii) are both
satised i¤  2 [h2(); h3()], i.e., for intermediate . However, it can happen that the interval [h2(); h3()] is
empty for all  2 [0; 1). This is the case when h2() > h3 () for all  2 [0; 1).
To determine A, we must nd the region in which (iv) the agent is incentivized and the optimal wage
is given by wA(Xg). From Proposition 4, we know that condition (iv) is satised when  2 [0; h2()], i.e., for
su¢ ciently small . However, it can happen that the interval [0; h2()] is empty for all  2 [0; 1). This is the
case when h2() < 0 for all  2 [0; 1).
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